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Abstract
The paper examines whether post secondary initial vocational training acts as 
a filter in the private sector segment of the Greek labour market, using a sam-
ple consisting of post secondary initial vocational training graduates and sec-
ondary education graduates (control group). The results suggest that no screen-
ing is evident in the case of male employees, whereas the hypothesis of 
«weak» screening cannot be rejected in the case of female employees.
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1.  Introduction
According to the human capital literature (Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1964; Mincer, 
1974), education and training are the main channels of producing, accumulating and 
diffusing human capital. According to human capital theory (Schultz, 1961; Becker 
1964), education and training enhance productivity and lead to higher earnings and 
wages. Alternatively, according to the screening hypothesis, employers use educa-
tion and training to find the workers with greater ability in a pool of job applicants 
whose qualities are uncertain. Screenists argue that education and training serve as a 
filter for individuals’ abilities and are not a productivity enhancing mechanism 
(Berg, 1971; Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975). 
More than 35 years have passed since the screening hypothesis has first gained 
attention, and yet, much is still unknown about the relative importance of the screen-
ing hypothesis compared to human capital theory. Following the seminal study (Ar-
row, 1973), testing the screening hypothesis has remained a popular research topic 
in the economics of education. One particular method of testing the screening hy-
pothesis is to evaluate the distinction between the «strong» and the «weak» version 
of the screening hypothesis. According to the «strong» version, employers continue 
to pay higher wages to the more educated or trained, even after the employee has 
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been with them for some time. According to the «weak» version, employers offer 
higher starting salaries to more educated or trained employees relative to the less edu-
cated or trained in the absence of any other information on the new employees’ ex-
pected productivities. But if education or training were really used as a screening de-
vice and the more educated or trained were not more productive relative to their less 
educated or trained counterparts, employers would adjust downwards the initial wage 
premim they offered. Or, the observed experience-earnings profiles of employees with 
different levels of education or training would converge rather than diverge, over time.
This paper tests both the «strong» version and the «weak» version of the screen-
ing hypothesis. The data come from a sample based on a survey conducted by the 
authors. This sample consists of selected private Greek enterprises and provides data 
on both post-secondary initial vocational training (PSIVT) graduates and secondary 
education graduates, who act as the control group.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we summarise the screening lit-
erature. Section 3 presents a brief background on the post-secondary initial voca-
tional training system, and Section 4 outlines the sampling methodology and the 
data. In Section 5, we report results from the empirical analysis, and in Section 6, we 
conclude.
2.  Literature review 
There is strong empirical evidence of the positive relationship between education or 
training and wages (Willis, 1986; Murphy & Welch, 1990). These empirical find-
ings, as is often the case with empirical research, are not unchallenged. Two con-
trasting views have emerged in recent decades. Human capital theory argues that 
education and training directly augment individual productivity by enhancing the 
cognitive, behavioural and manual capacities of individuals, thereby increase wages 
and earnings (Mincer, 1974; Becker, 1975). In contrast, according to the screening 
hypothesis, education and training are merely indicators of ability (Arrow, 1973; 
Spence, 1973; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1975). This hypothesis assumes that individuals 
hold different levels of productivity from birth. Thus, education and training merely 
signal inherent productivity without contributing to productivity. More capable indi-
viduals invest in education and training to signal their higher abilities, and employ-
ers use education and training to select more able individuals in the absence of better 
information. However, education and training do not contribute to productivity. In 
short, human capital theory holds that the economic value of education is productive, 
while the screening hypothesis argues for the informative value of education. Hu-
man capital theory and the screening hypothesis are the two elementary, competitive 
and complementary theories in the economics of education. They both explain the 
positive relationship between education and earnings (Li et al., 2009).
Another approach has been proposed that contrasts a «strong» and a «weak» ver-
sion of the screening hypothesis. This approach addresses a theoretical distinction 
between the «weak» and the «strong» version of the screening hypothesis, depend-
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ing on whether employers pay irrational wages at the initial hiring point («weak») or 
continuously («strong») (Psacharopoulos, 1979).
If employers have limited information on ability, they might use education or 
training as an initial filter («weak» screening), but as these employers accumulate 
direct evidence on the productivity of workers on the job, the employers will cease 
using education or training as a filter to determine promotions and pay increases. 
Under strong screening, except when employers do not observe productivity direct-
ly, as employees accumulate experience, employers will continue to pay more for 
education or training as a signal of ability. In the case of «weak» screening, the earn-
ings premium associated with education or training should decline with experience, 
whereas in the case of «strong» screening, this decline should not occur. Psacharo-
poulos (1979) reported that the wage differential associated with experience was 
higher in the distributive trades, which are assumed to be a competitive sector with-
out «strong» screening, than in public administration, rejecting the hypothesis that 
«strong» screening might persist in non-competitive sectors. The «weak» screening 
hypothesis, alternately, concedes that while the primary role of education and train-
ing is to produce a signal, education may additionally augment inherent productivity. 
The «strong» screening hypothesis presumes that productivity is immutable and that 
education and training are used exclusively as a signal. 
A number of empirical studies designed to test the validity of the screening hy-
pothesis have employed various data sets, methodologies and techniques but have 
reported contradictory results (Taubman & Wales, 1973; Layard & Psacharopoulos, 
1974; Wiles, 1974; Wolpin, 1977; Psacharopoulos, 1979, 1983; Riley, 1976, 1979; 
Lee, 1980; Katz & Ziderman, 1980; Albrecht, 1981; Fredland & Little, 1981; Liu & 
Wong, 1982; Miller & Volker, 1983; Tucker, 1985, 1986; Cohn et al., 1986, 1987; 
Arabsheibani, 1989; Ziderman, 1992; Oosterbeek, 1992; Groot & Oosterbeek, 1994; 
Brown & Sessions, 1999; Bedard, 2001; Riley, 2001; Spence, 2002; Heywood & 
Wei, 2004; Miler, Mulvey & Martin, 2004; Miler, 2009; Li et al., 2009).
So far, only a few studies on the screening hypothesis have focused on Greece 
(Lambropoulos, 1992; Magoula & Psacharopoulos, 1999; Psacharopoulos & Tsama-
dias, 2001). 
3. The Greek post-secondary initial vocational training system
In Greece, the system of lifelong learning operates in parallel with the formal educa-
tional system. The basic component of lifelong learning is the training system (law 
3369/2005). The training system consists of initial training and continuing training. 
Table 1 shows the structure of the educational system. 
The educational system, especially the secondary level of education, provides 
general skills with a particular emphasis on humanities. Thus, the educational sys-
tem does not intensively contribute to the acquisition of practical or vocational skills. 
The structure of the formal initial training system (post-compulsory and post-sec-
ondary) is summarised in Table 2 (law 1992).
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Table 1: The structure of the Greek formal educational system (2008–2009)
Levels Duration of  studies Age ISCED 
* Compulsory or
non-compulsory
Post-graduates studies
Ph.D. 3 years ≥ 24
Level 6 Non- compulsory
Master’s degree  2 years ≥ 22
Higher education
Universities 4–6 years ≥ 18
Level 5 Non- compulsory
Technological education institutions 4 years
Secondary education
Upper (higher) secondary education [lyceum] 3 years 15–17 Level 3 Non- compulsory
Technical-vocational school 2 years 15–16 Non- compulsory
Lower secondary education [gymnasium] 3 years 12–14 Level 2 Compulsory
Primary education
Primary (elementary) school 6 years 6–11 Level 1 Compulsory
Pre-school education **
Nursery school 4–5 Level 0 Non-compulsory
*   International Standard Classification for Education (ISCED, 1997) prepared by UNESCO
** Compulsory since 2010–2011
Table 2: The structure of the Greek formal initial training system (2008–2009)
Levels Durationof  training Age ISCED 
* Compulsory 
Post-secondary level
Initial vocational training institutes 2 years ≥ 18 Level 4 No
Post-compulsory level
Initial vocational training institutes 2 years ≥ 15 Level 4 No
*   International Standard Classification for Education (ISCED, 1997) prepared by UNESCO
The initial vocational training system is supervised by the Ministry of Education 
(MoE) and is mainly offered by both the public and private vocational training insti-
tutes (I.E.K.s). However some I.E.K.s are under the supervision of other ministries 
and agencies. The I.E.K.s provide all types of vocational training and ensure that 
students obtain all necessary qualifications by imparting scientific, technical, voca-
tional and practical knowledge and cultivating skills to facilitate students’ occupa-
tional integrations and adaptations to the changing needs of the production process. 
Graduates of compulsory education may enrol in the post-compulsory I.E.K.s, and 
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the graduates of every type of lyceum and technical vocational schools (T.E.E.s) 
may enrol in the post-secondary I.E.K.s. The duration of training for the unified 
lyceum certificate holders is four semesters. Each training year consists of two self-
contained semesters. T.E.E. or technical vocational lyceum (T.E.L.) cycle 2 certifi-
cate holders are directly admitted to the third semester of the I.E.K. in their speciali-
sation area (total duration of study: one year), or they may choose another I.E.K. 
specialisation area, in which case they study for the regular module of four semes-
ters. Certain I.E.K.s accepts gymnasium graduates over 18 years of age, who may 
study for up to two semesters. During the terms, the students attend compulsory 
theoretical, laboratory and mixed classes in the framework of the educational cur-
ricula, which cover a wide range of branches and specialisations in the following 
fields: Information Technology-Telecommunications-Networks, Financial and Man-
agement Services, Food and Drink, Transport and Tourism, Electronics-Electrics-
Engineering, Construction, Industrial Chemistry, Applied Arts, Energy-Environment, 
Health-Cosmetics-Social Services, Communications and Mass Media, Clothing and 
Footwear, Culture and Sport and Agriculture. Students in public I.E.K.s are charged 
fees for each semester. Scholarships are available in certain circumstances. In addi-
tion, students have the opportunity to participate in subsidised practical exercises. 
The fees charged by the private I.E.K.s vary and are adjusted each year in accord-
ance with the current regulations. Trainees who successfully complete their training 
in public and private I.E.K.s are awarded a vocational training certificate, which al-
lows them to take the qualifying examinations leading to the award of a vocational 
training diploma at the level of post-secondary (3+) vocational training. Nationwide 
examinations, held twice a year, include theoretical and practical tests. Adult gym-
nasium (Secondary chance school) graduates who study at the I.E.K.s’ post-gymna-
sium departments sit for qualifying examinations to obtain a vocational training di-
ploma, level 1. Before taking the qualifying examinations for the vocational training 
certificate, graduates may attend an optional six-month practical training course, 
which is considered a period of service for obtaining a licence to be qualified at an 
occupation. This training is provided by the public sector or by private firms and is 
supervised by a coordinator. The vocational training diploma is recognised both in 
Greece and in the other EU countries and is a prerequisite for obtaining a licence to 
be a member of a profession in the relevant specialisations. Links with firms are 
scarce, and there is no formal way to absorb and channel graduates into the labour 
market. 
4. Sources and data 
The current survey, which was conducted in the first semester of 2010, collected an-
nual earnings from the year 2009 from the hired labour of I.E.K.s and S.E. graduates 
(control group). The questionnaires were collected from I.E.K.s and S.E. graduates 
who do not have any additional education or training and have full time work. Pro-
ductivity bonuses are included in the annual earnings. Earnings from overtime are 
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not included. Self-employed I.E.K.s and S.E. graduates are not included because it 
is difficult to separate the income from self-employment from income from other 
factors in the production process. Part-time employees are additionally excluded. 
The sample was collected from 58 randomly selected, private enterprises located 
in Greek regions. In particular, 19 private enterprises were located in Attica, 15 in 
Central Macedonia, 14 were located in the other regions of continental Greece, and 
finally, 10 private enterprises were located in the North and South Aegean, Ionian 
Islands and Crete. Two of the private enterprises were in the primary sector, 23 were 
in the secondary sector, and 33 were in the tertiary sector. Of the 58 private enter-
prises, 14 were large (more than 100 employees), and 44 were small or medium size 
(under 100 employees).
In the public sector, the earnings of I.E.Ks. and S.E. graduates are the same (law 
3205/2003). We tested the application of the law in two ministries, five municipali-
ties and five other public entities. The tests show that the law has been applied. 
Our sample is divided into two sub-samples. Sub-sample I include I.E.K.s gradu-
ates who have full-time employment in the private sector, and sub-sample II consists 
of a control group of S.E. graduates who work as full time employees in the private 
sector. 
The sample has been stratified with a proportional distribution. The stratified sam-
pling not only provides increased accuracy but also allows separate estimates for 
each stratum. The proportional distribution is the most commonly used method of 
sampling by strata. This procedure happens in the absence of information on the 
homogeneity of the strata to ensure a representative sample (Zairis, 1991). 
At the beginning of this project, a pilot sample of 135 observations (80 S.E. grad-
uates and 55 I.E.K.s graduates) was collected.
The minimum size of each stratum of the sample is determined using the follow-
ing formula:
 n 0 =  
Σ W h S h 
2 
  ___________  
  
__
 Y2  CV 0 
2 ( _ yAN )
Where the standard error SE is estimated using the formula:
SE ( _ y) = CV *  
__
 Y
Where  W h is the weight of each stratum in the population,
 S h 
2 is the variance of each stratum,
 
__
 Y is the mean gross earnings (from the pilot sample) and
 CV 0 
2 ( _ yAN ) is the desired coefficient of variation.  
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We note that, using the pilot sample, we calculated the mean earnings as 15.545 eu-
ros per year. The  CV 0 was defined at 0.01 (1%) 
Table 3 presents the structure of the total population and the sample by employment 
sector and level of education or training. 
Table 3: Structure of the population and the sample by level of education or training  
and sector of employment, 2009
Educational or training levels
Population (per cent) Sample
Public sector Private sector Private sector
S.E. graduates 27.53 72.47 1,400
I.E.K. graduates 26.36 73.64 462
Source: Labour Force Survey, Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG, 2009)
5.	 Post-secondary	initial	vocational	training	as	a	filter
Table 4 presents the sample mean earnings of employees in the private sector in 
Greece for the year 2009, by level of education or training and by gender.
Table 4: Mean annual earnings by level of education or training and gender  
(in Euros, 2009)
Employees in the private sector 
Educational or training 
levels
Mean gross earnings N
All Males Females All Males Females
S.E. graduates 16,312 18,023 13,752 1,400 839 561
I.E.K.s graduates 17,252 19,273 15,524 462 213 249
All 16,545 18,276 14,297 1,862 1,052 810
Note: N is the number of observations.
A detailed earnings distribution by age and experience is given in Tables A-1 and 
A-2 (available from the authors on request). The mean earnings of I.E.K.s graduates 
are about 5.76% higher than those of S.E. graduates. More specifically, the male 
earnings premium is approximately 6.93%, while the female earnings premium is 
approximately 12.88%. These findings are in accord with human capital theory and 
the findings of empirical work conducted in Greece and abroad (Psacharopoulos & 
Tsamadias, 2001). In the public sector, there are no differences on earnings between 
I.E.K.s and S.E. graduates. 
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There are several methods to estimate the returns to private and social investment in 
education and training (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002). In this paper, we use the 
Mincerian method.
The private rate of return has been estimated by the formula:
LnYi = a + b . Si + c . EXi + d . E X i 
2 + ui
Where Yi is gross annual earnings, Si is years of study, EXi is experience (number 
of years), a is a constant, ui is the disturbance term and b, c and d are the regression 
coefficients.
Table 5: Estimates of the basic function using gross earnings and actual experience
Independent Variables
Dependent variable (LnYg)
Males Females
a (constant) 8.465**(50.03)
8.141**
(50.28)
S 0.0460**(3.46)
0.0567**
(4.44)
EX 0.0552**(12.42)
0.0555**
(11.37)
EX2 –0.00064**(–5.49)
–0.00062**
(–4.36)
Adj. R2 0.4181 0.4538
F 252.75 225.04
Significance 0.0000 0.0000
N 1,052 810
Note: ** Significance at the 5% level
Table 6:  The private rate of return (in per cent) using the Mincerian method
Gender Rate of return
Males 4.60
Females 5.67
The private rates of return for the public sector employees are zero because the earn-
ings of the I.E.K.s and S.E. graduates are similar. Therefore, the returns to training 
in the private sector are higher than the corresponding returns in the public sector. 
This difference means that private employers value training and pay a premium for 
it, hence rejecting the hypothesis that training is only used as a screening device. 
Moreover, these low returns indicate why there is such a relative low demand for 
post-secondary initial vocational training in Greece. 
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Figure 1 shows the mean gross annual earnings by years of experience, education or 
training levels and gender.
Figure 1: Mean gross annual earnings by years of experience, education or training levels 
and gender (in Euro)
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The initial earnings advantage of the I.E.K.s graduates compared with the S.E. grad-
uates (control group) is maintained at a constant level of about 5.76% throughout 
employees’ careers. This advantage is higher in the private sector than in the public 
sector. Furthermore, it is also higher for females (12.88%) than males (6.93%). 
Figure 2 shows the earnings ratios by years of actual experience for private sector 
workers. 
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Figure 2: Earnings ratios by years of experience (private sector workers)
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A more elaborate test explores the «weak» versus the «strong» version of the screen-
ing hypothesis. According to the «weak» version, employers could initially offer 
higher wages to the more educated or trained workers because of the absence of in-
formation on their prospective productivity. However, if education or training was 
indeed used as a screening device, and the more educated or trained were not more 
productive than their less educated or trained counterparts, private employers would 
adjust the initial wage premium downwards. That is, the observed experience-earn-
ings profiles of people with different levels of education and training would con-
verge, rather than diverge, over time. We narrow the test to include post-secondary 
initial vocational training versus secondary education. Thus, we included in our 
analysis only employees from the private sector of the economy to conduct a more 
rigorous test of the non-convergence of experience-earnings profiles with an interac-
tion term as follows:
LnYi = a + b * Si + c * EXi + d . (Si * EXi) + u                                                
Where Yi is gross annual earnings, Si is years of study and EXi is experience in 
years. 
Data were analysed based on actual experience and not on potential experience. 
The actual experience was derived from the sampling, while the potential experience 
data were derived using the Mincerian definition of experience (i.e., age minus years 
of education and training minus compulsory school entrance age). Potential experi-
Testing the role of screening with vocationals skills 159
ence might not accurately reflect true experience, particularly for females, because 
of their absence in the labour market for child-bearing and family reasons. Si * EXi 
is an interaction term, a is a constant, b, c and d are the regression coefficients, and 
u is the disturbance term. The sign of the coefficient d and its statistical significance 
determine whether filtering occurs. Thus, a positive and significant d would indicate 
divergence of the two profiles, while a negative and significant d would indicate 
convergence of the two profiles, lending support to the screening hypothesis. To 
improve the precision of the test, we have fit the above function separately for males 
and females. Table 7 presents a test for the sign and significance of the S * EX inter-
action term. 
Table 7: Testing for the screening hypothesis (dependent variable: LnYG)
Independent variables With actual experience
Males Females
α (constant) 9,043626**(–26,13)
7,283204**
(–21,83)
S 0,012298(–0,44)
0,1350051**
(–5,08)
EX 0,0035548(–0,18)
0,0982894**
(–4,89)
S * EX 0,0022816(–1,46)
-0,0050331**
(–3,15)
Adj. R2 0,403 0,45
F 237,14 219,6
Significance 0 0
N 1.052 810
The explanatory power of the model, Adj. R2, fluctuates from 40.3% to 45.0%. This 
level of fluctuation is satisfactory, given that we use cross-sectional data. In particu-
lar, the t-statistic is satisfactory. Splitting the sample by gender, for males, the critical 
interaction term, coefficient d, is positive but not stastistical significant, while for 
females d is negative and significant at the 5% level. These results indicate that for 
the male sub-sample, there is not a significant increase of earnings by years of expe-
rience, hence rejecting the screening hypothesis. However, for females, the differ-
ences in initial earnings between I.E.K.s graduates and S.E. graduates converge for 
the remainder of their careers. Our findings do not support that post-secondary train-
ing might only be used as a screening device, except perhaps for females. 
6. Concluding remarks
This paper tests both the «strong» version and the «weak» version of the screening 
hypothesis by using data on I.E.K.s and S.E. graduates. The empirical findings drive 
160 C. Tsamadias & S. Chanis
the concluding remarks. Firstly, in the public sector, the earnings profiles of the two 
groups are similar. Secondly, the initial earnings advantage of the vocational training 
degree holders compared with the control group is maintained at a constant level of 
approximately 5.76% throughout the employees’ careers. The earnings advantage is 
slightly higher, especially for females, in the private sector compared with the public 
sector. Thirdly, using a Mincerian earnings function with a year of education or training 
and experience interaction term, no statistically significant convergence or divergence 
of the earnings profiles is detected in the private sector. Only for females is there a 
statistically weak convergence of the experience-earnings profiles. Therefore, the evi-
dence shows that the «weak» version of screening hypothesis is valid only for females.
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